２００５年１１月２３日
皆様
１１月１７日、ヨーロッパ議会において、「大量破壊兵器不拡散」決議が採択されたとのニュースです。（ICBUWーベルギーのメンバーであるリア・ヴァージャウさんからの知らせです。）
第８２項は、「劣化ウラン兵器のモラトリアム＝暫定的使用禁止への要求を、全面的禁止の導入を目指しつつ、改めて表明する」とあります。
草々 嘉指信雄
--------------
Subject: stand van zaken in Europees parlement: zie paragraaf 82 van de meeste
recente WMD resolutie
news from the
EP:
resolution 'Weapons of
Mass Destruction' adopted on the 17th Nov.
read point 82:
82. Reiterates its call for a moratorium - with a
view to the introduction of a total ban - on the use of so-called "depleted
uranium munitions";
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Texts adopted by
European Parliament
Thursday 17 November 2005 -
Strasbourg Provisional edition
Weapons of mass
destruction P6_TA-PROV(2005)0439 A6-0297/2005
European Parliament resolution on non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction: A role for the European Parliament (2005/2139(INI))
The European Parliament ,
＾ having regard to United Nations Security Council Resolution
1540 (2004), describing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
and their means of delivery as a threat to international peace and
security;
＾ having regard to the
European Security Strategy (ESS), which states that the proliferation of WMD is
potentially the greatest threat to our security;
＾ having regard to the implementation of the ESS
and in particular the European Union Strategy against the proliferation of WMD
(the EU WMD Strategy) adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003,
＾ having regard to the fact that all European
Union Member States are States Parties to the major multilateral agreements that
make up the non-proliferation regime, namely the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the 1993
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) and that two Member States, the UK and France, are nuclear-weapon states
as defined in the NPT, and that US tactical weapons are stationed on the
territories of many more Member States: Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom,
Greece, the Netherlands and Belgium and states applying for EU membership,
Turkey in particular;
＾ having regard to
the Member States" commitment to pursue the universalisation of these
multilateral agreements, in particular in Council Common Position 2003/805/CFSP
of 17 November 2003(1),
＾ having regard
to the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, set up
by the UN Secretary-General, which states: 'We are approaching a point at which
the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result
in a cascade of proliferation',
＾ having
regard to the response by the UN Secretary-General in the report "In larger
freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all", underlining
the importance of multilateral agreements in safeguarding international peace
and security in the field of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons as well as
recent efforts to supplement shortfalls such as in UN Security Council
Resolution 1540 (2004),
＾ having regard
to its resolutions expressing concern at the proliferation of WMD and associated
materials and technologies, in particular its resolution on biological and toxin
weapons of 14 June 2001(2), its resolution on nuclear disarmament of 26 February
2004(3) and its resolution on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 2005 Review
Conference of 10 March 2005(4) ,
＾
having regard to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8
July 1996 on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons,
＾ having regard to Rule 45 of its Rules of
Procedure,
＾ having regard to the report
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on (A6-0297/2005),
A. whereas
nuclear non-proliferation issues have always been at the heart of the European
Union since the establishment of the European Atomic Energy Community by the
Treaty of Rome,
B. whereas non-proliferation policies remained limited
and are only now being seriously addressed within the ESS, and in particular by
the Member States through the EU WMD Strategy and the Commission's work, under
limited existing budget lines, in preparation of the 2007-2013 Financial
Perspectives,
C. whereas the EU Council achieved a Common Position
(including some 41 separate measures) that was presented at the 2005 NPT Review
Conference, but failed to persuade the other members of the NPT to pursue a
like-minded common strategy as set out in the Common Position, notwithstanding
that proliferation of WMD is to be considered as the most dangerous threat to
global security;
D. whereas this highlights the urgency with which the
European Union must provide new leadership to safeguard its interests by
reinvigorating the measures in the Common Position and the EU WMD Strategy in
order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime,
E. whereas the States
Parties will meet in 2006 for the BTWC Review Conference to monitor progress
towards implementation of the Treaty's provisions, and it is therefore essential
to find ways of developing verification provisions for the BTWC and to reinforce
the norms against biological weapons ＾ including measures to
criminalise the development and possession of biological weapons through
national legislation,
F. whereas the European Parliament remains
concerned that the EU WMD Strategy is currently weakened by inadequate financing
for the achievement of its objectives as specified in the list of priorities
attached to the progress report of the Office of the Personal Representative for
non-proliferation of WMD(5) ("the OPR") and the expected outcomes of the studies
run by the Commission under the Pilot Project 2004 entitled "Reinforcing EU
Cooperative Threat Reduction programmes: Community Action in support of the
European Union Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction",
G. whereas the EU WMD Strategy calls for an increase in
the EU's contribution to cooperative threat reduction in the light of the
Financial Perspectives beyond 2006 and envisages the creation of a specific
Community budget line for non-proliferation and disarmament of WMD,
Risk
of proliferation of WMD
1. Recognises that the multilateral agreements
making up the non-proliferation regime have succeeded in slowing down the spread
of WMD and delivery systems, and that those agreements deserve continued and
full support in the future, but also supports the view expressed in the ESS that
we are now entering a new and dangerous period that raises the possibility of a
WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East, North-East Asia and South Asia;
2. Believes that the proliferation of nuclear weapons seriously
increases the danger of nuclear war and, considering the catastrophic impact
that such a war would have upon all mankind, calls on all nation states to make
every effort to build an effective, efficient and equitable system that reduces
and progressively eliminates nuclear threats;
3. Rejects the development
of new-generation nuclear weapons (so-called mini-nukes or bunker-busting bombs)
and changes in nuclear doctrines, since these are increasing the military
utility of nuclear weapons, rather than reducing their prominence, thereby
undermining positive developments such as the United States-Russia strategic
nuclear weapons reductions; once again calls on the US administration to
permanently stop such developments; therefore welcomes the willingness of the US
Senate and Congress not to make available any further funding for the
development of mini-nukes;
4. Calls for immediate action to prevent the
further proliferation of ballistic missiles with extended range and greater
accuracy, through the development and extension of the membership of arms
control mechanisms such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the
Hague Code of Conduct;
5. Stresses that, at this moment of heightened
awareness of terrorism and homeland security threats, the security of civilian
nuclear, biological and chemical materials, plants and research laboratories,
both globally as well as in and around Europe, is ever more important;
6. Strongly believes that nuclear disarmament activity will contribute
significantly to international security and reduce the risk of thefts of
plutonium by terrorists;
7. Stresses the importance of limiting the risk
that sensitive WMD-related materials, equipment and/or technologies fall into
the wrong hands, by developing and enforcing effective export and transit
controls, and reinforcing border security management;
8. Underlines that
rapid technological development in the biological sciences as well as the
non-destruction and bad storage of biological weapons raise particular concerns
about such weapons in the near future;
European Union WMD policy
9. Calls upon the European Union and its Member States to make best use
of existing verification regimes and, where necessary, to propose new
verification instruments;
10. Calls on the EU and its Member States to
continue to provide full support to the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) in its efforts to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, namely
by gradually turning the Additional Protocol to the comprehensive safeguards
into the new verification standard;
11. Urges the European Union to
remain active in tackling the risk of proliferation of Cold War stockpiles of
chemical and nuclear weapons and materials of mass destruction as well as Cold
War biological materials and research facilities;
12. Calls upon the
European Union and its Member States to take up the work done under the aegis of
the IAEA looking into fuel assurance initiatives by developing a draft concept
that could be promoted as the basis for a new international consensus on access
to nuclear fuel;
13. Is of the view that the European Union should play
a more active role in non-proliferation and disarmament policies, in particular
in the framework of the fight against terrorism;
14. Calls upon the EU
to develop the necessary coordination mechanisms (the EU's WMD Monitoring Unit
in liaison with the EU Situation Centre) to ensure that intelligence is used to
build solidarity and confidence between the Member States on WMD policy;
15. Remains convinced that the European Union should, in implementing
the EU WMD Strategy, attach importance to concrete disarmament initiatives and
above all to non-proliferation actions, in order to persuade those outside the
European Union to engage in a common strategy for mutual security;
16.
Acknowledges the work done to fulfil the EU WMD Strategy in the first year and a
half of its existence, and in particular that accomplished by the Personal
Representative and the Commission, and stresses that the priorities for the
European Union should be:
a) continuation of political commitment at the
international level to promote implementation of the EU WMD Strategy;
b)
greater emphasis on disarmament initiatives as well as non-proliferation issues;
c) strengthening of the multilateral treaties making up the
non-proliferation regimes;
d) emphasis on non-proliferation and risks
associated with the use of WMD by terrorists;
e) provision of the
financial resources needed to implement the EU WMD Strategy;
17.
Calls on the Commission and the Council to prepare the programming of the
2007-2013 Financial Perspectives by setting out a list of priority actions and
associated costs for fulfilment of the commitments entered into in the framework
of the G8 Global Partnership against the spread of WMD, and for the extension of
its actions beyond the CIS in order to meet global needs;
18. Calls on
the European Union and its Member States to play a more active role in the
promotion of democracy and the resolution of frozen conflicts worldwide, since
this activity forms an integral part of a successful non-proliferation policy
and might substantially contribute to addressing the root causes of the WMD arms
race;
19. Invites the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy to provide substance on the question how to integrate the 1996
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 'Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons' in the EU's WMD Strategy;
EU practice
of establishing clauses on non-proliferation of WMD
20. Welcomes the
inclusion of clauses concerning non-proliferation of WMD in the latest European
Union agreements with third countries and action plans; points out, however,
that such measures must be strictly implemented by all the Union's partners
without exception; therefore calls for a speedy revision of existing agreements
and action plans that lack such a clause;
21. Calls upon all states
which have a cooperation agreement with the EU, and nuclear-weapons states in
particular, not to provide other states, especially states that are not parties
to the NPT, with any assistance or encouragement in the acquisition of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear devices which they may seek;
22. Recommends to
this end that a toolbox of elements be prepared in close collaboration by the
Council, the Commission and the Parliament to support any third country that
requests assistance in this area;
23. Calls on the Council and the
Commission to provide plans for technical assistance to any third country
seeking the Union's support in developing its national export control system in
order to comply with the clause or their reporting requirements under United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004);
24. Asks the Council
and the Commission to provide an estimate of the costs involved in supporting
third countries with the development of WMD non-proliferation legislation and
the setting-up of export control systems;
25. Requests the Council and
the Commission to report on those activities carried out in supporting third
countries with the development of WMD non-proliferation legislation and the
setting-up of export control systems;
Rejection of WMD deployment in
outer space
26. Recalls the provisions of Article IV of the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty, whereby States Parties undertake not to place in orbit around the
Earth or other celestial bodies any nuclear weapons or objects carrying WMD, not
to install WMD on celestial bodies, not to station WMD in outer space in any
other manner, and not to establish military bases or installations, test any
type of weapons or conduct military exercises on the Moon or other celestial
bodies;
27. Calls upon the European Union and the Member States to
explore the possibility of negotiating additional outer space agreements, in
order to ensure the peaceful exploration and use of space and to prevent any
arms race in outer space;
Responses to infringements of the UN system
28. Calls on the EU Presidency and the Council to provide further
substance on ways of achieving the objective in the EU WMD Strategy to 'foster
the role of the UN Security Council, and enhance expertise in meeting the
challenge of proliferation';
29. Calls upon the European Union and its
Member States, to that end, to provide the necessary resources to set up a UN
technical assistance unit on verification and compliance;
30. Calls on
the European Union to provide technical assistance to those nation states
seeking support in fulfilling their reporting requirements under United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004);
31. Calls for the further
development of activities under Resolution 1540 (2004) to include assessment
teams with the task of examining the veracity of submitted reports and
determining the extent to which members of the United Nations are implementing
their commitments under that resolution;
32. Calls for the development
of principles for a targeted and appropriate sanctions regime, to be applied
against those that fail to fulfil their non-proliferation obligations under UN
Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004);
33. Calls for the necessary
resources to enable the European Union to contribute significantly to any future
UN-sanctioned inspection regime.
Strengthening effective multilateralism
34. Takes note that as stated by Dr Hans Blix the credible threat of the
use of force has played an important role in facilitating the disarmament work
of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC;
35. Considers it essential that no military
strategy becomes detached from the disarmament strategy in any given crisis, in
order to avoid any premature expulsion of international verification teams,
which remain one of the most important verification instruments;
36.
Considers it essential, in the interests of effective multilateralism, that all
timely diplomatic and political channels be used to ensure that international
law on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is fully implemented in
accordance with the UN Charter;
37. Underlines that nuclear weapons are
for deterrence purposes; supports the political commitments made by the
nuclear-weapons States not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapons
States ("negative security assurances"), and reiterates that there would be no
winners in a nuclear war;
38. Stresses the importance of the adoption of
measures aimed at discouraging States from withdrawal from the NPT; supports the
efforts by some EU Member States which are NPT signatories to examine Article X
on withdrawal from the Treaty and to facilitate referral to the UN Security
Council in the event of withdrawal;
Traditional and emerging nuclear
powers
39. Calls on the nuclear-weapons States under the NPT - with
particular emphasis on NATO members UK, France and USA - to pursue timely,
progressive and significant steps towards the elimination of their nuclear
arsenals in accordance with the undertakings contained in legally binding
treaties and agreements, thereby strengthening their moral authority and
credibility;
40. Calls once again on Israel, India and Pakistan to
become States Parties to the NPT;
41. Emphasises the need for stronger
regional and multilateral security arrangements in the Middle East, the Indian
subcontinent and North-East Asia in order to reduce the pressure towards nuclear
proliferation and to achieve the abandonment of related programmes;
42.
Calls on the European Union to work with its international partners to develop
and promote a WMD-free zone in the Middle East; to that end, supports the
related work being undertaken within the Barcelona Process;
43.
Recommends that the European Union should attach the utmost importance to
effective implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime in the
Mediterranean, since security in Europe is inherently linked to security in that
region;
44. Reminds any future Member State of its obligation to
strictly abide by its international commitments, which prohibit the acquisition
and development of weapons and materials of mass destruction, and the
transmission of such weapons, materials or technologies to any third state or
non-state actor;
45. Recalls previous resolutions, in particular its
resolution of 13 October 2005 on Iran(6) , as well as its earlier resolutions on
Iran of 28 October 2004(7) and 13 January 2005(8) ;
46. Considering the
mistrust aroused by Iranian activities over a sustained period of more than 17
years, as stated in the resolution adopted on 24 September 2005 by the IAEA,
calls on Iran to take all necessary steps to restore the international
community's confidence and trusts that Iran can responsibly and transparently
develop a civilian nuclear energy programme by:
- meeting in full its
commitments, notwithstanding its rights, under the NPT,
- fully
cooperating with the IAEA,
- continuing to cooperate with IAEA
inspectors as it has done since 2003,
- ratifying, without delay, the
IAEA Additional Protocol,
- returning to its commitments under the Paris
Agreement,
- re-establishing full and sustained suspension of all
aspects of its uranium enrichment-related activities, including tests and
production at the uranium conversion facility at Isfahan,
- and subject
to the above, a full return to negotiations with the EU aimed at the successful
conclusion of a Trade and Cooperation Agreement;
47. Expresses
extremely deep concern that on 10 February 2005 North Korea declared its
possession of nuclear weapons; welcomes the recent breakthrough in the six-party
talks and specifically North Korea's commitment to abandoning nuclear weapons
and rejoining the NPT; supports the statement of 19 September 2005 by the
Director-General of the IAEA, Dr El-Baradei, on the return of IAEA inspectors to
North Korea; reiterates the importance of the European Union having a seat in
the on-going negotiating process and playing a meaningful role in the
implementation of the recent agreement;
48. Therefore urges North Korea
to rejoin the NPT, to revoke its decision to withdraw from the six-party talks
and to allow the resumption of negotiations in order to find a peaceful solution
to the current crisis;
49. Similarly urges both North Korea and the
United States to seek a speedy resolution of the current crisis, the first step
being a United States offer to recommence heavy fuel oil supplies in exchange
for the verified freezing of the Yongbyon plant;
50. Reminds the Council
that the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization initiative has played
a significant role in the recent past and could well serve a useful purpose as
regards future conventional energy supplies;
Results and development of
2005 NPT Review Conference
51. Reiterates that the NPT remains the
cornerstone of the multilateral non-proliferation regime, that it should be
preserved in its integrity and that non-compliance with its provisions should be
pursued through the UN Security Council; recalls that there should be no double
standards where the application of the NPT is concerned;
52. Expresses
disappointment and deep concern over the failure to reach by consensus useful
recommendations to be addressed to the next NPT Review Conference and regrets
that the European Union did not take up the initiative of the Mayor of Hiroshima
for a nuclear-free world by 2020;
53. Expresses disappointment over both
the outcome of, and the role played by the Member States at, the 2005 NPT Review
Conference; calls however on the Member States, the Council and the Commission
to pursue in good faith the 41 measures contained in the Common Position; in
this connection, calls on the United States to abandon its negative attitude to
the NPT;
54. Calls in particular on France and the United Kingdom to
reinvigorate their pursuit of the 13 disarmament steps and to engage with the
United States, Russia and China, who also committed themselves to the process at
the end of the 2000 NPT Review Conference;
55. Calls on the Council and
the Member States to effectively implement the provisions of the Final Document
of the 2000 NPT Review Conference aimed at the conclusion of a treaty
effectively banning the production of all weapons making use of fissile
materials; stresses that, in the absence of a final document at the 2005 Review
Conference, these provisions remain in force as a political and legal obligation
binding on NPT States Parties;
56. In so doing, reiterates its support
for the conclusion of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and
effectively verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty;
57. Calls
equally upon all states that have not already done so to now sign and ratify the
CTBT; underlines that under no circumstances should any state start or resume
explosive nuclear testing; reiterates its conviction that everything possible
must be done by the EU and by NATO to persuade the US administration to give up
its resistance on this issue;
58. Calls on the Council and the
Commission to submit additional proposals aimed at convincing those Third States
that have not already done so to now sign and ratify the IAEA Additional
Protocols;
Joint action in the framework of US-EU transatlantic
relations
59. Urges the European Union and the United States to continue
their positive dialogue in the fields of non-proliferation and the fight against
terrorism, in accordance with the European Union-United States Declarations on
combating terrorism and on the non-proliferation of WMDs adopted at the EU-US
Summit on 26 June 2004 and reaffirmed on 20 June 2005;
60. Reaffirms the
importance of stronger cooperation with the United States in order to strengthen
the international system of treaties and regimes against the spread of WMDs, to
ensure strict implementation and compliance, to support non-routine inspections
and to recognise that other measures in accordance with international law may be
needed to combat proliferation;
61. Stresses the urgency of signature
and ratification of the CTBT without delay, unconditionally and in accordance
with the institutional processes of that treaty, so as to ensure its entry into
force at the earliest possible moment;
62. Calls on the Council and the
Commission to insist on the urgency of such signature and ratification in
dialogue with the United States and all other partner states that have not yet
ratified the CTBT and/or the NPT;
63. Calls on the United States to
clarify the situation as regards the quantity and strategic objectives of its
tactical nuclear arsenals stationed on European bases;
Non-state actors
64. Calls on the European Union to work with its international partners,
the UN, the IAEA, OSCE and NATO, to develop and promote mechanisms to prevent
terrorist organisations, or countries harbouring terrorists, from gaining access
to weapons and materials of mass destruction;
65. Considers that every
effort should be made to prevent any state or non-state actor from acquiring,
developing or profiting from the development, diversion or use of weapons and
materials of mass destruction;
66. Is of the view that the Proliferation
Security Initiative is an important instrument to tackle the proliferation of
WMD and should complement UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) and the
existing non-proliferation regimes;
G8 Global Partnership
67.
Underlines the importance of programmes for, inter alia, the security and
disposition of weapons-related materials, physical protection of facilities and
laboratories, detection and deterrence of illicit trafficking in WMD materials,
strengthening of export controls and redeployment of former weapons scientists
as defined under the G8 Global Partnership;
68. Encourages the
establishment of joint international nuclear research and industrial projects as
confidence-building steps;
69. Supports further financial commitment in
the framework of the Financial Perspectives 2007-2013 to the G8 Global
Partnership against the spread of WMD and related materials; this should
support, inter alia, further effective and definitive disarmament measures by
contributing to the chemical weapons destruction and multilateral plutonium
disposition efforts in Russia; calls upon Russia to make a greater financial
contribution to both programmes;
70. Calls on the Commission and the
Council to present an annual progress report on the realisation of the
commitment made in Kananaskis in 2002 on behalf of the EU to the G8 Global
Partnership;
71. Points out that history has demonstrated that far too
many states, including EU Member States, have irresponsibly exported materials
and technology from which nuclear weapons can be fabricated and that this has
greatly contributed to current problems of uncontrolled proliferation;
underlines therefore that national and multilateral control systems should
operate hand in hand to prevent any undesirable proliferation of WMD;
Export control of nuclear materials
72. Emphasises that the
European Union should be a leading cooperative player in the export control
regimes, as underlined by the EU WMD Strategy, in particular by improving the
efficiency of export controls inside the EU, under the "Dual-Use" Regulation(9)
and by setting up an assistance programme to those states which need technical
knowledge in the field of export control;
73. Calls for more pro-active
EU and national approaches to the control of exports of dual-use items in order
to avoid the risk of possible access to sensitive items by terrorists and other
undesirable end-users in third countries;
74. Welcomes the development
by the Commission, as the first of a series of actions supporting the possible
setting-up of a longer-term EU export control cooperation initiative, of the
TACIS project in Russia, the Pilot Project 2004 in the Balkans, and the Pilot
Project 2005 in four additional countries or regions;
75. Calls on the
Council to provide a report on the political dialogue with partners on export
controls and calls on the Commission to report on the progress of well-monitored
implementing of the Dual Use Export Control projects; also calls for an
analysis, with cost estimates, in the framework of the Financial Perspective
2007-2013, by both the Council and the Commission on how such projects could be
expanded to other regions and countries;
Chemical and biological weapons
76. Calls for proper implementation of the CWC and adequate funding for
the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW); is of the view
that challenge inspections should be conducted on those suspected of violating
the terms of the treaty;
77. Urges the Member States, the Council and
the Commission to elaborate a clear and persuasive European Union position at
the BTWC meeting of States Parties on 5 to 9 December 2005 in order that a
comprehensive Common Position may be presented at the 2006 BTWC Review
Conference;
78. Calls on the European Union to provide for technical
assistance for developing countries with regard to disease surveillance (in
accordance with Article X of the BTWC);
79. Urges the Member States
concerned to withdraw their reservation to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, since a
policy of retaliation in kind with chemical and/or biological weapons runs
counter to the BTWC obligations;
80. Within the framework of the
forthcoming Financial Perspectives, calls on the Commission to evaluate the
feasibility of cooperative assistance programmes with third states to strengthen
the security of biological materials, laboratories and facilities;
A
role for the European Parliament
81. Recalls the positive contribution
that can be made by the European Parliament in addressing common security
concerns on non-proliferation and disarmament in its capacity as a budgetary
authority, as already shown in its support for nuclear safety and nuclear
security programmes under TACIS;
82. Reiterates its
call for a moratorium - with a view to the introduction of a total ban - on the
use of so-called "depleted uranium munitions";
83. Recalls
equally the positive contribution that the European Parliament has continued to
make in the case of the second Pilot Project (2005), whereby EUR 1.5 million has
been allocated for use by the Commission to launch an EU Export Control
Cooperation Initiative; recalls its decision to continue supporting such actions
with the financing in 2006 of a third Preparatory Action enabling the Commission
to further prepare the ground for future Community-funded programmes under the
new Financial Perspectives 2007-2013;
84. Recalls the role that
Parliament plays in its codecision legislative capacity and as a budgetary
authority in issues such as the proposed Stability Instrument, which should
include export controls and border security, support for chemical weapons
destruction and weapons-grade fissile material elimination, radioactive and
nuclear material management and control, bio-security, conversion of former
weapons expertise, etc., in coordination with a Nuclear Safety Instrument,
export controls, etc.;
85. Further recalls its involvement via assent in
the Union's most important international agreements with third countries, and in
particular those agreements which include a non-proliferation clause; recalls in
that connection the support required from Parliament for all those initiatives
designed to counter proliferation in certain countries by offering cooperation
in return, and for any other kind of international agreement or partnership;
86. Asks therefore that the European Parliament be fully associated with
all initiatives aimed at implementing the EU WMD Strategy;
87.
Recommends that an official Parliament delegation attend the next NPT Review
Conference as well as the BTWC Review Conference;
88. Calls on the
Member States and the Council to include Members of the European Parliament in
the Union's delegation at any future peer review on export controls; also calls
on the Council and the Commission to keep Parliament regularly informed about
the EU's role at the Australia Group, the MTCR, the Wassenaar Arrangement and
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG);
89. Proposes to adopt annually a
report on the status of non-proliferation activities of the European Union
containing relevant policy recommendations;
Financial aspects of the
European Union strategy against the proliferation of WMD
90. Calls on
the Member States to assign adequate financial resources to implement the
priorities listed in the progress report by the OPR;
91. Calls on the
Commission to set out in a transparent and clear manner the resources it has
already committed for both "nuclear safety" and "WMD non-proliferation";
92. Calls on the Commission to present in a transparent and clear manner
the resources needed for the necessary Community contribution to the EU WMD
Strategy during 2006 and under the new Financial Perspectives 2007-2013, making
a clear distinction between "nuclear safety" and "WMD non-proliferation"
headings;
93. To that end, calls on the Commission to set out a list of
priorities and estimated costs for the actions necessary to meet its commitment
in the framework of the G8 Global Partnership, and for extending its action
beyond the CIS to meet global needs;
94. Calls on the Council, the
Commission and the Member States to support specific projects conducted by
multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA and the OPCW, and to provide
financing where appropriate;
95. Calls in particular on the Member
States to provide finance regarding the list of priorities of the OPR for export
controls and technical assistance programmes;
96. Is of the view that
conflict prevention and crisis management should not be financed at the expense
of the WMD prevention budget, and that the high-level ambitions expressed in the
WMD Strategy and supported by all the European institutions and Member States
require an adequate level of financing; recalls in this connection the
increasing difficulties in funding recent initiatives (specifically the renewal
of the Joint Action with the OPCW and a new Joint Action in support of the BTWC)
from the CFSP budget or Community instruments;
97. In the framework of
the discussions on the Financial Perspectives 2007-2013, proposes therefore a
review of the existing Interinstitutional Agreement of 6 May 1999 and the
establishment of a specific budget line within the Union's budget to finance all
activities regarding WMD issues, irrespective of whether they fall within the
Community or CFSP framework, whilst respecting their respective decision-making
processes as well as the competences of the Council, the Commission and the
Personal Representative;
98. Instructs its
President to forward this resolution to the Presidency-in-office of the Council,
the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member
States, the UN Secretary-General, the governments and parliaments of the United
States, Russia, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, Iran and North Korea, and all
other States party to the NPT and members of the IAEA.
(1) OJ L 302,
20.11.2003, p. 34.
(2) OJ C 53 E, 28.2.2002, p. 400.
(3) OJ C 98
E, 23.4.2004, p. 152.
(4) Texts Adopted, P6_TA(2005)0075.
(5)
Council of the European Union, OPR, "Implementation of the WMD Strategy: 6
monthly progress report/List of priorities", 3 December 2004: http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/st15246.en04.doc.
(6) Texts Adopted, P6_TA(2005)0382.
(7) OJ C 174
E, 14.7.2005, p. 190.
(8) OJ C 247 E, 6.10.2005, p. 159.
(9)
Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 setting up a Community regime for the
control of exports of dual-use items and technology (OJ L 159, 30.6.2000, p. 1).
Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1504/2004 (OJ L 281, 31.8.2004,
p. 1).